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Constitutionality of Automobile Accident Compensation
Reform by Federal Law-A Second Look

C. Dallas Sands*

The "first look" at this subject, as part of the Department of Transportation
Automobile Insurance and Compensation Study,' was taken before any reform
proposals had been reduced to concrete bills for consideration by Congress and
before other components of the Study had assembled the rich harvest of pertinent information and made it available for examination. That discussion was
therefore unavoidably speculative and hypothetical in nature.
It treated the commerce and spending powers as the most obvious sources
of constitutional authority for congressional legislation to improve the system
for compensating victims of automobile accidents. Reflecting the belief that
congressional power stemming from those constitutional roots still is not unlimited, it postulated that the evils to be remedied must be (1)economic in nature
in order for the commerce power to support federal remedies,' and (2) national
(trans-state) in scope to justify federal remedies under either the commerce
power or the spending power. 3 The "first look" noted that the evils to be
remedied were the faults in the system for allocating the costs of automobile
accident losses, not of the losses themselves. Furthermore, the faults with which
the system was most often charged were "most naturally and obviously related
to humanitarian considerations and the ideal of justice" whereas "factual documentation [had] not yet been published which would support a confident judgment that the evils in our present system have a substantial adverse bearing on
the national economy." 4 For that reason, I concluded that although the question was doubtful enough that a deliberate congressional finding that federal
reforms were needed for economic reasons probably would pass muster with the
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Supreme Court. the proofs on which Congress could base such a finding had
not yet been made. s
A vast amount of pertinent information has subsequently been provided in
the reports which were the work product of the DOT study. This second look
reviews that information as it bears on the question of congressional power.
Particular reference is made to bills that have now been proposed.
The principal bills are forthrightly regulatory in nature.6 They prohibit the
operation of vehicles on public highways without first-party insurance coverage
conforming to prescribed standards and provide qualified exemptions from tort
liability for damages caused in motor vehicle accidents.7
By reciting a purpose to regulate interstate commerce, the titles of all of the
principal bills make it explicit that they rely on the commerce clause as the
source of constitutional authority. Findings to support use of the commerce
power were recited in a policy section of the first bill to be introduced in the
Senate last session, and in three of the House bills introduced in this session.'
Even though reciting a purpose to regulate commerce in a bill, or even in an
enacted statute, does not make it so, 9 these statements afford some insight into
the thinking of those who contributed to their formulation of constitutional
foundations for congressional action. They declared that the free flow of interstate commerce was obstructed by the following circumstances:
(I)

The great number of motor vehicles operated within the

5. Id.at 93.
6. S. 945, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971); H.R. 3968, 4994, 5220, 6528. 7514. 10222, 10808. 92d
Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
Also pending are allied bills to facilitate no-fault insurance coverage in group policies: S. 946.
947, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971); H.R. 3970, 4995, 5221. 5459, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
There is also pending in each house a resolution to urge the states to take the initiative in enacting
no-fault plans: H.R. Con. Res. 241, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
Bills similar to some of those now pending were initially introduced in the last Congress, i.e.. S.
4339, 4340, 4341, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1969).
7. The main difference of substance between different bills has to do with whether the exemption
from tort liability applies to catastrophic losses. Tort liability would continue for damages for
catastrophic harm in excess of economic losses under S. 945; H.R. 3968, 5220, 5460, 7514. The
exemption would extend to damages for even catastrophic loss under H.R. 10222 and 10808.
S. 945 and H.R. 3968, 5220, and 5460 carry short titles of "Uniform Motor Vehicle Insurance
Act."
H.R. 7514, 10222, and 10808 have short titles of "National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance
Act."
8. S. 4339, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 3968, 5220, 5460, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
The section is the same in all four bills.
9. See Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1921); Dougherty v. Bethune. 7 Ga. 90
(1899).
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channels of interstate commerce upon the public streets, roads and
highways of the states;
(2) The substantial amount of injury and death resulting therefrom;
(3) The insufficient, unfair distribution and untimely availability
of monies under the present motor vehicle liability insurance system
for the adequate rehabilitation and compensation of accident victims;
(4)

The absence of uniform and sufficient requirements for:
(A) Insurance among the States as a condition to
using the public streets, roads, and highways;
(B) Guaranteeing the continued availability of motor
vehicle insurance supplied by private enterprise; and
(C) Meaningful price information to promote rational buying decisions and thus stimulate beneficial
competition; and

(5) The failure to promote the general welfare by not recognizing
sufficiently the plight of motor vehicle accident victims while promoting the national policy of accelerating the construction of the
Federal-Aid Highway Systems.'"
The way in which these circumstances were said to "obstruct the free flow"
of interstate commerce was "by increasing unnecessarily the hazards of travel"
within interstate channels and by "otherwise affecting such commerce.", These
findings were followed by a declaration thatIt is the purpose of this Act to provide for the general welfare by
requiring a system of motor vehicle insurance which will be uniform
among the States, which will guarantee the continued availability of
such insurance and meaningful price information; and which will
provide sufficient, fair. and prompt payment for rehabilitation and
losses due to injury and death arising out of the operation and use
of motor vehicles within the channels of interstate commerce, and
2
otherwise affecting such commerce.'
Since the declared purpose is to serve the general welfare by measures calculated to alleviate evils which attend use of the "channels of interstate commerce." the authors of the declaration evidently conceived congressional power
10. See note 8, supra.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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to rest on the ideal of a national motor transportation system, just as a similar
conception was found to sustain extensive federal controls over matters having
to do with rail transportation.13 Although treating every public street. road, or
highway as part of a national system goes beyond legislative or judicial precedent in connection with rail transportation, 4 legislation defining the rights and
liabilities of everyone using the system in matters connected with such use is
readily comprehended within the principles under which the Federal Employers
Liability Act of 1908 was sustained. 5
But these legalisms seem unrelated to the substantive realities pertinent to a
judgment about the distribution of function, responsibility, and authority in the
federal system. It is hard to see the connection between the real reasons for
automobile accident compensation reform and the question whether every person on every trip on any public way in the country is engaged in interstate
commerce. Use of this conception of a national motor transportation system
has the appearance of verbal posturing to rationalize action prompted by other
considerations. The position seems to treat the Constitution as an irrelevancy
to be gotten around when it complicates matters instead of a set of guidelines
to be either followed in good spirit or overtly changed when they prove to be
unwise. Perhaps this is why the findings and declaration of policy have been
omitted from more recent bills.
At best, hackneyed verbalizations of constitutional idiom inserted into the
findings and policy of a bill are less convincing than factual documentation of
constitutionally germane reasons for congressional action. Studies such as those
carried out by the Department of Transportation (DOT) can provide such
documentation. However, the DOT Study was addressed primarily to the question whether reforms were needed, and only incidentally to whether reforms by
federal law would be constitutional within our federal scheme of things." Never13. Wisconsin R.R. Comm'n v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 257 U.S. 563 (1922). See Southern Ry.
v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911).
14. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912); Southern Ry. v. United States, 222
U.S. 20 (1911).
15. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
16. For the insights they provide concerning the general thrust of the Study, descriptive titles
of the various reports are listed below:
Public Attitudes Toward Automobile Insurance (March 1970); The Origin and Development
of the Negligence Action (March 1970); Automobile Accident Litigation (April 1970);
Comparative Studies in Automobile Accident Compensation (April 1970); Constitutional
Problems in Automobile Accident Compensation Reform (April 1970); Economic Consequences of Automobile Accident Injuries (April 1970) Vols. I & II; Structural Trends and
Conditions in the Automobile Insurance Industry (April 1970): Insurance Accessibility
for the Hard-to-Place Driver (May 1970); Mass Marketing of Property and Liability
Insurance (June 1970) (by Spencer Kimball and Herbert Deneberg); An Analysis of Complaints
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theless, the reports contain a wealth of data that may be interpreted with
reference to the question of whether defects in the old system have national
economic significance.
A survey of the economic consequences of automobile accident injuries
[Survey] documented the magnitude of the automobile accident problem with
nationwide statistics. 7 It reported that in 1967, according to one way of estimating, there were 2,075,000 personal injuries sustained in automobile accidents. Another estimate, made by the National Center for Health Statistics,
counts 3,096,000 people who "sustained injuries that required medical attention
or resulted in one day or more of restricted activity."'" In 1967, economic losses
from auto accidents amounted to $10.5 billion-S1.2+ billion for medical expenses, $4.2+ billion for lost wages, $4.8 billion for property damage, and $.2
billion for other expenses. 9 "Aggregate economic losses [in 1967] for seriously
injured persons and fatalities" amounted to $5.1 billion or $9.1 billion, depending on whether future lost earnings for fatalities who had no dependents and
whose losses of future earnings accrue only to society, are counted.20 Of the 1967
loss $3.4 billion (32%) was incurred by 45,000 very seriously or fatally injured
victims who sustained losses of $25,000 or more and average losses of $76,000.1
Also, "the approximately 22 million victims who suffered only property damage (in 1967) incurred total losses of about $3.8 billion." 22
in Selected Automobile Insurance Markets (July 1970) (by Douglas G. Olson, assisted by
August R. Ralston); Automobile Personal Injury Claims (July 1970), Vols. I & 11; Causation,
Culpability and Deterrence in Highway Crashes (July 1970) (by David Klein and Julian H.
Waller): Economic Regulations and Insurance in the United States (July 1970) (by John G.
Day); Insolvencies Among Automobile Insurers (July 1970) (by Douglas G. Olson); A Study
of Assigned Risk Plans (August 1970) (by Dennis F. Reinmuth and Gary K. Stone); Motor
Vehicle Assigned Risk Plans (August 1970) (by William T. Hold, assisted by Harry P.
Haiduk); Price Variability in the Automobile Insurance Market (August 1970) (by Calvin H.
Brainard and Stephen A. Carbine); Rehabilitation of Auto Accident Victims (August 1970) (by
John Henle); Public Attitude Supplement to the Economic Consequences of Automobile Accident
Injuries (September 1970); Quantitative Models for Automobile Accidents and Insurance (September 1970) (by Joseph Ferreira, Jr.); Driver Behavior and Accident Involvement: Implication for
Tort Liability (October 1970); Compensation for Motor Vehicle Accident Losses in the Metropolitan Area of Washington, D.C. (December 1970); The Price and Availability of Automobile Liability Insurance in the Nonstandard Market (January 1971) (by Douglas G. Olson, assisted by Frank
G. Vukmanic); Motor Vehicle Crash Losses and Their Compensation in the United States (March
1971) (by John A. Volpe).
17.

UNITED STATES

QUENCES

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS & WESTAT RESEARCH,

INC., ECONOMIC CONSE-

OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INJURIES (April 1970) [hereinafter cited as SURVEY].

18.
19.

Id. at +,3.
See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES 4 Table I (March 1971) (prepared by J. Volpe) [hereinafter
cited as VOI.PE].

20.
21.
22.

supra note 17, at 23, 40.
Id.at89-90.
VOLPE, supra note 19, at 6.
SURVEY,
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Net reparations from all sources received by 1967's victims were reported at
$6.5 billion.2 "On the average, about half of total personal and family economic loss was recovered."'" About nine out of ten victims recovered some
losses. Amounts recovered from all sources came to more than double the
amount of under $500 losses, while "only 30% was recovered when losses
exceeded $25,000" confirmed the existence of a serious mismatch between reparations received and losses actually sustained." The tort system's heavy responsibility for this mismatch is shown by the fact that tort recoveries averaged
four and one-half times the amounts of losses under $500 and only one-third
(net) of losses over $25,000.25
The Survey further disclosed that:
About one-third of recovery for personal and family losses due to
serious injury or fatality was from tort (claims against another party
or his insurance company), 15% from medical and auto medical
insurance, 14% from life insurance, 6%from collision insurance, and
24% from wage replacement sources (sick leave, workmen's compensation, Social Security, and other sources of replacement for
actual or future wage losses)."6
Legal costs amounted to about one-fourth of total recovery under
27
tort for serious injury or fatality cases.
On the average, 16 months elapsed between date of accident and
final settlement of tort claim. Larger economic losses were settled
after longer delays and small losses after shorter delays.25
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 14.
Id. at 36.
Id.
SURVEY, supra note 17, at 2. Sources of compensation were broken down as follows:
Almost half received some medical insurance benefits.
35 percent recovered from auto medical insurance.
45 percent recovered from tort claims.
30 percent received benefits from collision insurance.
About 65 percent of seriously injured and fatalities were covered by some form of medical
and hospital insurance. About 54 percent were covered by auto medical policies.
27. Id. Claims against another party were made in 65 percent of serious injury or fatality cases.
About 65 percent of those who made such claims retained counsel, and 74 percent of those retaining
counsel actually filed lawsuits. About eight percent of lawsuits filed actually reached verdict. Thirty
percent of families with incomes under $5,000 retained counsel, compared to 42 percent of families
with incomes over $ 10,000. The ratio of reparations to loss was 0.38 for low income families and
0.61 for high income families. Persons with higher educational achievement had a greater tendency
to retain counsel and also had a higher ratio of recovery to loss.
28. Id. at 3.
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Males in the age group 15 to 44 constituted 20% of the population
but suffered 39% of the serious injuries and fatalities.
Both actual and future wage losses of serious injuries or fatalities
were poorly compensated for-about 15% from sick leave, workmen's compensation, Social Security and similar sources and an
unknown amount from tort. Total net tort recovery, however, was
only about one-fifth of total wage loss, so it is clear that total
recovery of wage loss was relatively small.2 9
Insurance is bound to have a critical place in any system of rationalizing the
distribution of costs of automobile accidents. The monumental proportions of
the auto insurance business and the extent of its concentration, which reveal the
degree to which insurance is part of both the problem and the solution, were
documented in reported findings from another part of the Study. 30 Because of
29.

Id. at 4.

30.

U.S.

DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, STRUCTURAL TRENDS AND CONDITIONS IN TIE AUTOMO-

(April 1970).
(I) There were 858 individual auto insurance companies in 1968 that wrote $11.4
billion in earned auto premiums. Adjusting for group ownership of auto insurance companies indicates there are slightly under 600 decision-making firms in the auto insurance
industry nationwide. In auto liability coverages there are only about 450 decision-making
firms nationwide.
(2) Of the over 800 individual auto insurance companies in 1967 the 174 companies
with over $10 million in earned auto premiums accounted for 86.6 percent of industry
premiums. Thus the relatively large number of auto insurers with earned auto premiums
under $10 million accounted for only 13.4 percent of industrywide earned auto premiums.
(3) There were 179 individual auto insurance companies licensed in only I state in
1967. These companies accounted for 21.6 percent of the number of companies but only
4.5 percent of net premiums written of all auto lines. At the other end of the geographic
coverage spectrum there were 261 companies that were licensed in 30 or more states
accounting for 31.5 percent of the number of companies and 80 percent of net premiums
written.
(4) Local auto insurance companies, on the average, are much less diversified within
the property-liability insurance industry. The 179 local companies had 78 cents of each
property-liability net premium dollar in auto lines while the 261 national companies had
only 46 cents of each premium dollar in auto lines in 1967.
(5) The number of new entrants into the auto insurance industry has declined significantly in recent years dropping from an average of 15 per year from 1955-64 to only 6.5
per year from 1965-68. There was only one new entrant in 1967 and 1968 that was not
affiliated with an already established insurance group.
(6) National concentration of industry earned auto premiums accounted for by leading auto insurer groups in 1968 was 27 percent for the 4 largest, 38 percent for the 8
largest and 56.6 percent for the 20 largest. This compared to 18.7 percent for the top 4
in 1955, 28.8 percent for the top 8 and 46.3 percent for the 20 largest. Though concentration nationally in auto insurance is not high compared to many other industries, a
marked upward trend in concentration among leading groups is evident from 1955 to

BILE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
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their statistical eloquence, some of those findings deserve attention.',

1968. The composition and rank of the 20 largest groups has been relatively stable over
the past 10 to 15 years.
(7) Concentration among the largest companies or groups at the state level is higher
than on a national basis and tends to vary inversely with premium volume in the state.
Average concentration among the 10 states with direct premiums written of $275 million
or more in 1967 was 35 percent among the 4 largest, 49.9 percent for the 8 largest and
72.7 percent for the 20 largest. For the 15 states with direct premiums written of under
$50 million the simple average of the 4 largest was 42.9 percent, 8 largest 60.6 percent
and 20 largest 84.6 percent.
(8) Leading national insurers by-and-large are also leading insurers in the individual
states. For example, for the 50 states and the District of Columbia in bodily injury
coverage in 1968, the 20 largest national insurers held 47 first ranked positions, 39 second
place positions, 41 third ranked positions and 36 fourth ranked positions. In 25 states
an auto insurer not among the 20 national groups of 1968 held one or more of the three
leading positions in the three major lines of auto coverage in 1968.
(9) The compound annual growth rate from 1955-68 of earned premiums for 7 direct
writers among the 20 largest auto insurance groups of 1968 was 10.3 percent compared
to 9.1 percent for 13 agency writers. Four direct and five agency writers had a compound
annual growth rate of over 10 percent during the period. Among 145 individual companies with earned auto premiums of $10 million or more. 109 agency companies had a
compound annual growth rate of 9.1 percent in earned auto premiums compared to 11.1
percent for 36 direct writers.
(10) The pace of merger activity involving property-liability insurers has accelerated
in recent years. A total of 580 property-liability insurers were acquired in the 9 years
from 1960-68 involving $10 billion in admitted assets. In 1968 alone $4.8 billion in
admitted assets were acquired-48 percent of the $10 billion acquired during the entire
period 1960-68.
(11)
In recent years the predominant type of acquisition involving acquired propertyliability insurers with $10 million or more in admitted assets has been non-insurance
companies acquisition of auto insurers. In 1968 there were 13 "other" or "pure" large
conglomerate mergers involving 82.4 percent of auto insurer assets acquired in that year.
(Table 22, p. 40) The 25 "other" large conglomerate acquisitions of auto insurance
companies from 1960 through the first 9 months of 1969 involved $6.6 billion-60
percent of $10.8 billion in admitted assets acquired.
(12) Restrictions placed on the operating practices of insurance companies in some
states have prompted some insurers to seek ways of minimizing regulatory supervision.
The formation of holding companies by major insurance companies has been the means
to accomplish this end. The holding company structure provides a more flexible vehicle
to accomplish diversification. While insurers have not been particularly active in acquiring companies outside the insurance industry, there has been significant effort directed
toward developing capabilities in related financial services activities such as premium
financing, real estate development, marketing of computer services, small loan operations, and development and marketing of mutual funds.
(13)
Nonmerger exits from the auto insurance industry in the 1960's accelerated
significantly compared with the period 1955-60. Although only 19 nonmerger exits were
recorded for the period 1955-60, 77 were identified during the 8-year period 1961-68.
Involuntary exits by receivership and failure accounted for 77 of the 96 nonmerger exits
recorded from 1955-68. There were 19 voluntary withdrawals during the period. Three
states had 5 or more failures from 1955-68: Illinois 12, Pennsylvania 12 and Texas 5.
Id. at 2-4.
31. VOL PE, supra note 19, at 52.
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It was elsewhere disclosed that 56% of revenues in the auto liability insurance
overhead and 23% to
system go for operating costs, including 33% for general
32
sides.
both
for
attorneys
and
investigators
pay claims
Insolvencies Among Automobile Insurers came to the "conclusion that the
insolvency problem has resulted in notable, unanticipated losses by policyholders and/or third party claimants." 3 3 Although the report concludes that the
insolvency problem does not warrant federal regulation of the auto insurance
business,u it indicates that some of the responsibility for inadequate protection
of policyholders from consequences of insurer insolvency is attributable to
absence of uniformity among state regulatory approaches and methods.1
The negative influences of state pluralism in insurance regulation were likewise noted in another report. It was asserted that "insurance problems, needs
and environmental influences cannot be neatly compartmentalized within state
lines," and that "the necessity for insurers to comply with the diverse and often
antithetical requirements of the several jurisdictions in which they operate imposes economic burdens upon insurers and ultimately upon the policyholders."3
Price Variability in the Automobile Insurance Market confirmed that insurance prices vary significantly according to geographical region, so that lower
prices could be achieved in peak price areas through regulations establishing a
national average price level. 37 Of course something which the information itself
cannot answer is whether this would be fair to people in areas having lower
accident rates and lower repair costs. The report also noted the pressures of
competitive forces to relate insurance costs to differences in risk potentials
among insurance buyers. It noted further that price differentials based on risk
potentials can produce prohibitive prices for high risk drivers. The report endorsed the principle that some measure of "socialization" of the costs of insurance for high risk drivers "make[s] sense within the context of a free enterprise
society" to avoid banning them from all use of automobiles. It also makes clear
that the larger the market within which "socialization" can be undertaken, the
32.

U.S.

DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, INSOLVENCIES AMONG AUTOMOBILE INSURERS

21 (1970).

33. Id. at 144, 145.
at 40.
34. Id.
35.

U.S.

DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF INSURANCE IN THE UNITED

STATES, 66, 67 (July 1970).

36.

U.S.

MARKET-ITs

DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION,

PRICE
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(1970).
37. Id.at 143.
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greater is the measure of flexibility for fashioning national pooling or subsidy
systems with which to spread the margin of prohibitive cost. "
Another study reported that "the laws of the several states" impose "a
multitude of unreasonable barriers to the free development of mass marketing
of property and liability insurance," and asserted that there is an "urgent need
to strike down" such barriers so that mass marketing "may help provide a
more adequate and equitable insurance market.""9
All this data, viewed in relation to the problem concerning constitutionality
of federal legislation, makes it obvious that the tort-insurance system as it
presently operates has broad economic dimensions and that reform efforts are
inextricably enmeshed in far-flung economic ramifications. The clearest overview of the dimensions of the automobile accident compensation problem in the
United States appears in the preamble of a resolution now pending as the
"administration" proposal in both houses of Congress. This appears to recapitulate key findings and conclusions of the DOT study and recites the following
points about the present system.
It overcompensates many for small losses and undercompensates
many who have large losses.
Administration costs are "inordinate."
Benefit payments are "ill timed and unresponsive to victims' needs
both because of long delays in payment and because payments are
predominantly in the form of lump-sum payments," making "effective rehabilitation" of victims "a practical impossibility."
State laws compel motorists to buy liability insurance without assuring its availability; state regulatory pressures on insurers have produced "socially undesirable competition in risk selection accompanied by arbitrary and capricious declinations of insurance, cancellations and refusals of renewal with the consequent growth of a highrisk automobile insurance market serviced in some cases by insurers
of questionable financial stability."
It puts intolerable burdens on state insurance regulatory authorities.
It takes too much time and resources of the courts.
Court delays force the seriously injured into inadequate settlements.
resulting in denial of "substantial and equal justice."
38.

U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION. MASS MARKETING
(June 1970).
H.R. Con. Res. 241, 92d Cong., ist Sess. (1971).
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Third party liability insurance precludes having insurance premiums
reflect vehicle safety and differences in repair costs.
"[Tihe principal problems and abuses with respect to automobile
insurance clearly stem from defects in the system for compensating
accident victims and from the compulsions upon motorists to obtain
the insurance which sustains and upholds that system." 4"
Proof that the compensation system can measurably affect the amount of net
economic losses to society which result from automobile accidents is still lacking. "When cars collide, no way of distributing the cost can undo the damage."" There are, however, many who believe and many who doubt that the
fault system deters reckless driving and thereby prevents the losses to society
due to auto accidents from being as high as they would be otherwise. The DOT
Study does not convincingly resolve this dispute. An engaging point touching
this same problem was made in testimony presented in hearings before the
House Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance, when it was suggested that
first-party insurance might, through premium differentials, induce motorists to
shop for safer cars.12 But this, too, is speculative.
Even if net losses to society can not be undone by insurance and liability
systems, national economic interests may nevertheless be affected by the way
in which losses from automobile accidents are distributed. National economic
well-being is prejudiced, for example, when individual economic distress resulting from uncompensated losses impairs an individual's economic productivity.
This occurs also when the timing of compensation payments prevents or postpones rehabilitation. In this respect the evils to be remedied are economic in
nature and trans-state in scope, justifying exercise of the commerce power to
effect a remedy.
However, one may still suspect that humanitarian considerations rooted in
sympathy for the tragic plight of traffic systems, plus civic and professional
concern for the reasonableness of social and legal institutions, supply the princi40.

U.S.

DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, CONSTITUTIONAL

COMPENSATION REFORM,

PROBLEMS IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT

supra note I, at 60-61.

No fault insurance promises, over time, to decrease the total economic cost of
accidents relative to continuation of the liability system. Insurance premium differentials,
by model of auto, will begin to reflect the safety, durability and ease of repair by
magnitudes vastly exceeding anything now possible. Today, the entire premium for bodily injury (if we exclude the modest element for medical or uninsured motorist) is solely
a function of the safety built into some stranger's car.
Statement of Samuel M. Loescher, Professor of Economics, Indiana University, Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 664 (1971).
42. H.R. Con. Res. 241, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
41.
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pal motive force for reforms in the field of automobile accident compensation.
In our federal system, these matters remain generally to be determined under
state law, save only as they may have a trans-state economic dimension. However, a new insight emanates from the Study. It is the realization that the spirit
of the grant of power enabling Congress "to regulate commerce among the
several states" can do more than justify federal control over interstate movements, transactions, and measures in order to secure and maintain a healthy
national economy. That spirit can also reasonably justify federal remedies for
non-economic evils, where the trans-state economic dimensions of the problems
of fashioning a remedy make it clear that nothing short of a national remedy
could be fully effective.
The Secretary of Transportation. in his concluding report to Congress and
the President based on the entire DOT study expressed the following judgments:
Ultimately, the systems of the several states must be compatible.
Although there are means available to overcome great diversity,
these are cumbersome and a reasonable degree of national uniformity seems best. For a number of reasons motor vehicle travel is an
interstate activity of major proportions and a consistent minimum
standard for accident reparations involving all of the motoring public, wherever they travel, would constitute sound public policy."
Unless the doctrine that Congress' powers are limited to those that are affirmatively granted ("enumerated") in the Constitution is to be abandoned,
however, the fact that something is "sound public policy" does not imply that
Congress can do it. Congress still lacks any general authority to relieve from
the inefficiencies of federalism by legislating compatability and uniformity
among the states in ordinary municipal law and in matters unrelated to commerce or one of the other subjects over which the Constitution entrusts stewardship to Congress. Nor is it clear that all "motor vehicle travel" is interstate
activity or that all "interstate activity" comes under the commerce power.
A review of the reports from the DOT study has nevertheless led me to revise
my thinking. Contrary to the conclusions drawn after my "first look" at the
problem, I am now persuaded that the design of reforms is so much concerned
with trans-state economic forces that national remedies may be the only ones
able to cope with it. The course presently being pursued by the administration
is to stimulate state initiative for the state remedies. If that effort fails to bring
about effective reforms, the constitutional justification for reforms by congressional legislation under the commerce power will be established.

